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Abstract 
On 23:57 July 31st, 2014, a catastrophic vapor explosion occurred in the downtown of Kaohsiung 
city. The incident was initiated from a leak of an underground pipeline transporting pressurized 
propylene liquid. Analysis of pipeline operation logs and pipeline break release modeling 
suggested that at least 90,000 kg of propylene leaked, entered the underground trench and spread 
4.5 km in distance before meeting an ignition source three hours later. The ignition caused a 
significant confined vapor explosion which blew out the road above the underground trench, 
damaged more than one hundred vehicles on the road with thirty two fatalities and more than three 
hundred injuries.  
This incident bears similarity to two previous incidents: the explosion in Guadalajara, Mexico, in 
1992, owing to a gasoline leaked into sewer through a corroded pipeline which resulted in 252 
fatalities and more than 1500 injuries (Andersson and Morales, 1992); and the explosion in 
Qingdao, China, in 2013, owing to a leak of crude oil from a corroded pipeline into the city storm 
drains which resulted in 62 fatalities and 136 injuries (Zhu et al., 2015), and. Key factors 
contributing to the large number of fatalities and injuries in these incidents are due to the very large 
quantity of flammable mass leaked, the confinement in the sewer or drain, and they occurred near 
or inside the well-populated communities. There was however a subtle difference in the present 
case in that the leak source was a pressurized, flashing liquid which would vaporize completely 
upon leak into ambient environment while the other two cases dealt with flammable liquids with 
only partial vaporization. Challenges and recommendations in addition to detailed analysis of the 
incident are given to prevent and mitigate the occurrence of similar incidents. 
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Background of the Pipeline 
 
The incident was related to a pipeline connecting the LCY Chemical Corporation Tashe Plant and 
the harbor terminal company, China General Terminal & Distribution Corporation (CGTDC). It 
 
 
was a four inches pipe buried about 1 m below grade with a total distance of about 27 km solely 
devoted to transporting pressurized, liquid propylene. Its route was planned in 1986 and operation 
started in 1993. A total of three underground pipelines, one 8-in ethylene line, one 6-in propylene 
line, and one 4-in propylene line, were built at the same time by Taiwan CPC Corporation and the 
4-in line was transferred to LCY after the erection. Initially, the 4-in line was connected to the 
Taiwan CPC Corporation Cianjhen terminal. Subsequently, an extension line to CGTDC terminal 
was built as a second supply source. Although planning of the pipeline route had carefully avoided 
the major downtown residential area, most part of the pipeline was now surrounded by commercial 
and residential buildings. 
 
Event leading to the explosion 
 
The incident was first reported from an unknown fog to come out intermittently from roadside 
rainwater trench covers and manholes of the storm trench beneath the junction of Ersheng 1st Road 
and Kaixuan 3rd Roads in downtown Kaohsiung City on 20:46 July 31st 2014, as shown in the 
inserted photos (a), (b) and (d) in Figure 1. Fire fighters from Kaohsiung City Fire Bureau reached 
the site on 20:50, secured the area and began spraying water on the fog. An incident command post 
was also setup in the foot path of the road junction. Efforts were made to identify the leak materials 
and leak source but were unsuccessful. While the fog erupting from manholes of the storm trench 
beneath the junction of Ersheng 1st Road and Kaixuan 3rd Roads diminished gradually, a small 
explosion in the manhole of storm water trench occurred about 1 km away from the initial leak 
scene on 22:20. The explosion however did not escalate. Around 22:50, a major white smoke was 
found coming out from a nearby light rail construction site underground trench opening as shown 
in the inserted photo (c) in Figure 1. This opening was then considered as the source of the leak 
and the site was considered as the hot zone with restricted entry. Air samples were also taken back 
for analysis. Unfortunately, explosion occurred before the air sample was analyzed. Another 
peculiar and unresolved finding at 23:45, right before the explosion, was an intermittent suction or 
flowing sound from a manhole near the railroad as shown in the inserted photo (e) in Figure 1. 
There was however no vapor eruption from this manhole. Thus, there was no clear conclusion 
regarding the leak gas, the leak source and the source owner before the explosion. Formal 
confirmation of the leak gas to be propylene was delayed to 6:30 am the following day by residual 
gas on the intact storm water trench in Ersheng 1st Road. Figure 1 shows the schematic diagram 
of the pipeline, underground trench, the spread of the leak vapor and corresponding photos for the 
vapor eruption at different locations. 
Investigation after the explosion revealed the pressure transmitter on the side of Taiwan CPC 
pipeline connected to LCY pipeline recorded a sudden drop of pipeline pressure from 4.2 MPa to 
1.37 MPa on 20:43. Both CGTDC and LCY Tashe Plant did not installed pressure transmitter on 
their side of pipeline. Only pressure gauges and flow meters were installed. Subsequently, 
 LCY Tashe Plant operator found in the control room that the pipeline flow meter indicated 
zero flowrate. LCY operator phoned CGTDC operator in CGTDC control room. CGTDC operator 
found that the flowrate from the pump was abnormal and reached 33,000 kg/hr, well above the 
normal flow rate of 23,000 kg/hr. The operator also found that the pumping pressure was dropped 
from 4.0~4.5 MPa to 2.7 MPa and further dropped to 1.8 MPa, while the electric current for the 
pump motor rose from 120~130 amperes to 180 amperes. The operator then shut off the pump and 
pipeline isolation valve. The pipeline pressure dropped to 1.3~1.35 MPa after the shutoff. The 
engineers of the two sites discussed and decided instead of carrying out a pressure test at pumping 
 
 
pressure, a static pressure test with isolation valves at both sides of pipeline closed was carried out. 
The pipeline pressure maintained at the propylene vapour pressure of 1.3~1.35 MPa. By 22:00, 
LCY manager demanded to start pumping again. By 22:15 pumping restarted but CGTDC pipeline 
flow meter indicated a flowrate of 24,500 kg/hr yet LCY operator found that their flow meter 
indicated a flowrate of 6,000 to 7,000 kg/hr. Engineers of both companies agreed that such flowrate 
discrepancy should be resolved later. On 23:23, a CGTDC foreman for the next shift smelled 
propylene near Kaixuan 3rd road on his way to work. He suspected that it could be a leak from 
their pipeline and thus he rushed to CGTDC plant. He arrived 10 minutes later, expressed his 
concern to control room operators and ordered the shutdown of the pump. By 23:57, explosion 
occurred. Neither companies informed the Kaohsiung City Fire Bureau or any government 
agencies regarding the flow rate and pumping pressure abnormalities even after the explosion. The 
slow response and negligence of operators in combined with production oriented plant manager 
were the major contributing factors for the catastrophic explosion.  
 
The Explosion and the damage 
 
Without any warning, an explosion occurred near the command post on 23:57 July 31st. The 
explosion was occurring beneath the road surface with a smoke erupting out from the storm water 
trench manhole, followed by road surface crack, and a large fire erupted out. Figure 2 shows a 
sequence of frame from a recorder on a fire truck. The arrow in the first frame indicates the first 
smoke eruption from the manhole. The road surface was blown out and pushed upwards all 
vehicles and personnel on the road and then collapsed to the trench. The fire truck in Figure 2 was 
eventually turned upside down.  
Figure 3 shows the pipeline route, the explosion affected area, the distribution of causalities, and 
corresponding photos for damages. The explosion propagated along the Kaixuan 3rd road to the 
north and south along the storm water trench. At the north end of Kaixuan 3rd road, the explosion 
propagated towards Sanduo 1st road and its junction to Wuqing 2nd road. A total of 4.5 km road 
were blown out.  
The junction of Sanduo 1st road and Wuqing 2nd road suffered the largest fatalities and injuries as 
indicated in Figure 3. Wuqing 2nd road is famous for many midnight snack shops. A surveillance 
video showed that there was a red light stopping several cars and scooters right before the 
explosion. Another factor contributed to the significant fatalities in this area is that the road surface 
covering the storm water trench was only about 0.5 m which is very thin comparing with the 1 ~ 
2 m in other roads. The explosion not only blew out the road surface but also shattered the road 
into small fragment and debris. Some of the debris was even blown up to the roof of four-floor 
houses as seen in Figure 3. Causalities were mostly caused by the debris impact and the explosion 
flame. The explosion on the Sanduo 1st road eventually diminished about 400 m east from the 
junction of Wuqing 2nd road.  
The second largest fatalities were occurred in the junction of Kaixuan 3rd road, Ersheng road and 
Ersheng 1st Road which centered on the incident command post. Fire trucks that parked on the 
Kaixuan 3rd road were overturned by blown out road as shown in Figure 3. More than twenty fire 
trucks were damaged. Most fire fighters stayed near the fire trucks were injured or buried by the 
debris or the overturn fire trucks. Seven of the ten fatalities on this road junction were fire fighters.  
The explosion damage on the south side of Kaixuan 3rd road and Yixin 1st Road was less severe 
compared with other area as shown in Figure 3. It is likely that most explosion energy was 
dissipated by the thick road surface on top of the storm water trench. Vehicles remained intact even 
 
 
after the blown out. There was also far less debris compared with Sanduo 1st road. An additional 
factor that contributed to the reduced damage was road block. Most part of Kaixuan 3rd roads were 
blocked after the leak and thus the explosion exposure was reduced. The explosion on the Yixin 
1st road continued through the storm water trench near Guanghua 3rd road eventually vented 
through the No. 5 boat canal and blown out the canal terminal. The road surface on Guanghua 3rd 
road was however intact.  
 
The pipeline break 
 
Despite the complicated leaks and silence of the pipeline operators, the identification of the leak 
source after the explosion was straightforward without ambiguity. After the explosion, a large jet 
fire developed near the junction of Ersheng 1st Road and Kaixuan 3nd Road as shown in Figure 
4(a). This was the largest fire after the explosion and it lasted till 6 am the following day. As the 
fire diminished gradually, it can be seen clearly that the fire was coming out from a branch of storm 
water trench as indicated in Figure 4 (b) and (c). Clearly, this would be the source of leak. 
Subsequent inspection of the trench branch with jet fire revealed that there were three pipelines 
passing through the trench. The 4-in line was completely exposed in air and had a break opening 
of 4 cm by 7 cm as shown in Figure 5. The 6-in and 8-in lines were located next to the 4-in line, 
partially exposed in air, and remained intact. These two pipelines did not suffer the jet flame 
impingement from the 4-in line as they were located on the back side of the 4-in line opening. 
Inspection of the leaked pipeline also showed pipeline wall thickness greatly reduced from its 
original 6 mm to less than 1 mm by corrosion from the humid ambient environment in the trench. 
Thus, it is concluded that it was the LCY 4-in propylene pipeline leaked and caused the explosion. 
 
Amount of the leak 
 
It is important to estimate the leak rate and amount of leaked in order to assess the potential damage 
and evacuation zone. The leak rate was dominated by leak opening and the pipeline pressure. 
Figure 5(a) shows the pipeline pressure recorded at Taiwan CPC Cianjhen terminal which is a 
branch line to the CGTDC and LCY pipeline. As the Taiwan CPC Cianjhen terminal was close to 
CGTDC pumping station, the recorded pressure can be a good approximation of the upstream 
pressure of the leak. As the boiling point of propylene is far below the ambient pressure, the leak 
from the pipeline may or may not flash depending on the upstream pressure. If the upstream 
pressure is higher than the saturation vapor pressure, the propylene may leak out as a liquid before 
flashing. If however the upstream pressure is close to the saturation pressure, flashing is expected 
and the typical two-phase flashing flow across an orifice may be used (Crowl and Louvar, 2012). 
As Figure 6(a) indicates that the pipeline upstream pressure after the break was very close to 
propylene saturation pressure, flashing two-phase flow will be the dominant mode of leak. 
Although more detailed modeling can be done for the two-phase pipe flow, Chen et al. (1995) 
showed that the liquid dried out is expected to occur in about 10 s for a 100 m pipeline containing 
liquid propane and butane. In the present case with very long pipeline and long leak time of more 
than 1 hr, liquid dry out was also expected near the break and the vapor choked flow equation 
(Crowl and Louvar, 2012) can be a good estimation of leak rate. 
Figure 6(b) showed the recorded flowrate on CGTDC and LCY side. The area difference between 
the two records will be the amount lost during pumping and mostly in liquid form. Direct 
integration gives 34,000 kg. For the valve closed period, a total of 97 min, the loss is calculated to 
 
 
be 56,800 kg from the vapor choked flow equation and 160,000 kg from the flashing flow equation. 
The latter is far larger than the possible pipeline inventory of 100,000 kg based on the 27 km of 
pipeline volume and propylene density. As expected, the value from vapor choked flow calculation 
is considered a more realistic value compared with that from flashing flow equation. Thus, a total 
of 90,800 kg propylene was estimated to leak before the ignition. The estimated amount of leak is 
far too large to be safely dispersed in air without ignition and explosion. There is also no way to 
safely dispose or mitigate the flammable cloud from the trench.  
 
Spread of the leak 
 
It is important to know how the leak in the trench was spread such that responders may take proper 
action in future incidents. Investigation revealed that there were two storm water trench branches 
as shown in Figure 7, one being directly beneath the Ersheng Road but is only 7 m in length and 
sealed in the other end, the other being about 10 m north of the dead ended branch and housed the 
pipelines. The later was then connected to the trench beneath Ersheng Road. We put up a schematic 
diagram in Figure 1 showing all the trenches and trench openings. The trench branch that housed 
the pipeline had a manhole upstream which was the manhole with the suction sound. As the pipe 
break was facing towards the main trench, the leak from the break would form a jet and entrained 
significant air from the upstream trench. The direction of the leak is thus in consistent with the 
finding of suction sound in the upstream manhole. It is also consistent with the fact that there was 
virtually no damage in Ersheng road. The vapor jet impinged on the trench beneath Kaixuan Road 
and spread in both direction regardless of the trench sloping as shown in Figure 1. The vapor flow 
was completely different from a liquid leak which would flow by gravity. The spread of the leak 
vapor in the underground trench was governed by the flow resistance which is in turn affected by 
trench size, branched flow and trench opening to ground. Branch flow is in general much smaller 
than line flow in a tee junction. Flow into a larger branch is also favored over a small branch. 
Finally, the area with most vapor escaped do not necessarily corresponds to the leak source but 
rather depends on the size of opening to ground. These findings will be useful for all incident 
commanders dealing with underground pipeline leak incidents provided that all underground 
trenches are well documented and available during the incident.  
 
The probable ignition source 
 
Another important factor contributing to the vapor explosion is the ignition source. It is crucial to 
identify the exact ignition source so that a better site control in any future incident can be taken. 
As the ignition occurred more than three hours after the leak, it is difficult to determine the exact 
ignition source owing to very wide range of release dispersion. A fault tree analysis was performed 
and a total of six possible ignition sources were identified: autoignition, driving vehicles, smoking, 
fire truck engine, static discharge, and open flame. Videos from road surveillance cameras, vehicle 
driving recorders, and reporter video cameras were collected and used to identify the direction of 
fire and explosion propagation as well as possible ignition sources. All videos pointed to the 
junction of Ersheng and Kaixuan Roads as the explosion initiation location. All possible ignition 
sources were excluded except for the fire trucks that parked inside the road block zone. 
As the area were blocked for traffic, the only available ignition sources were the fire trucks which 
remained running to provide firewater. In fact, there was a fire truck near the junction of Ersheng 
1st road and Kaixuan Road as shown in Figure 4(b). The engine of the fire truck after the explosion 
 
 
was completed burnt down, yet Figure 4(c) showed that the road sign in front of the engine 
remained intact. Thus the fire on the fire truck engine was unlikely to be caused by the jet fire from 
the leak pipeline. Figure 4(c) also showed the char from burnt fire truck tire after the removal of 
fire truck. The white arrow in Figure 4(c) was the location of a telephone cable junction box cover. 
The telephone cable junction box is not sealed but usually drained to nearby storm water trench. It 
is very likely that the vapor in the storm water trench spread out into the junction box, and 
eventually escaped the cover to meet the truck engine and ignited. The ignition resulted in flame 
propagation and explosion along the storm water trench with smoke eruption from the trench 
manhole. With flame accelerated along the trench, the explosion intensity also increased. 
Eventually the road surface blew out with erupted flame. The explosion propagated through the 
entire trench that filled with flammable vapor. 
The analysis suggests the importance of strict control of ignition source during a flammable release. 
In fact, the only safe outcome of such a large release of flammable vapor into a confined space is 
a slow dilution to below flammability limit. Either premature ignition or recovery of flammable 
vapor is extremely difficult and risky to do. 
 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
A large leak of flammable liquid or vapor from a pipeline into an underground confined space such 
as a storm water trench is a recipe of disaster. It is difficult to identify and stop the leak source. It 
is also extremely difficult to recover or dispose the leak from the confined space. Control of 
ignition source is also difficult owing to numerous opening to ground. In fact, the only safe 
outcome of such a flammable leak is continuing dilution to below flammable limit. It is 
recommended that all risk assessment of underground pipeline should include analysis on the 
potential leak into nearby trench. This will be the largest risk associated with an underground 
pipeline.  
To safely dilute the flammable leak, we propose a concept of suppression the flame propagation 
rather than the explosion overpressure by injecting inert gas into the underground duct. 
Experimental studies (Lin et al., 2017) were carried for the suppression by an inert gas of flame 
propagation in one section of a tube to another section filled with flammable mixtures. The critical 
length of the inert gas section required for successful suppression is determined to be less than 0.3 
m for a 3-m ignition section containing propylene/air mixture near stoichiometric concentration. 
To suppress the flame propagation, one simply need to inject inert gas into the duct at fixed 
intervals. The best point of injection of inert gas will be the manhole to the underground trench. 
Tests are planned by using a large duct with an internal diameter of 0.5 m to provide a near-field-
scale validation for the current results. It is hoped that the above inertia isolation method can 
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the pipeline, underground trench, the spread of the leak vapor 




























































Figure 3: The pipeline route, the explosion affected area, the distribution of causalities, and the 






Figure 4: Photos of the fire after the explosion on the north side of junction of Kaixuan 3rd road 
and Ersheng 1st road. Time of the photos: (a) 12:00 am (b) 06:00 am (c) 07:05 am. Red arrow 
indicates the location of storm water trench branch with the leaked pipeline. Yellow arrow 
indicates the fire truck engine suspected to be the ignition source. White arrow indicates the char 
from burnt fire truck tire. Note for the road sign in front of the engine remained intact. 
 
 
Figure 5: Photos of (a) the storm water trench, the 4-in propylene pipeline and the break, (b) 




Figure 6: (a) Pipeline pressure recorded at Taiwan CPC Cianjhen terminal, a branch line to the 







Figure 7: Photo of the storm water trench branches, the left one housed the pipelines and the 
right one was sealed in the other end with a total length about 7 m.  
 
 
